Consider the permutation S in RC4. Roos pointed out in 1995 that after the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) of RC4, each of the initial bytes of the permutation, i.e., S[y] for small values of y, is biased towards some linear combination of the secret key bytes. In this paper, for the first time we show that the bias can be observed in S [S[y]] too. Based on this new form of permutation bias after the KSA and other related results, a complete framework is presented to show that many keystream output bytes of RC4 are significantly biased towards several linear combinations of the secret key bytes. The results do not assume any condition on the secret key. We find new biases in the initial as well as in the 256-th and 257-th keystream output bytes. For the first time biases at such later stages are discovered without any knowledge of the secret key bytes. We also identify that these biases propagate further, once the information for the index j is revealed.
Introduction
RC4 is one of the most well known stream ciphers. It has very simple implementation and is used in a number of commercial products till date. Being one of the popular stream ciphers, it has also been subjected to many cryptanalytic attempts for more than a decade. Though lots of weaknesses have already been explored in RC4 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20] , it could not be thoroughly cracked yet and proper use of this stream cipher is still believed to be quite secure. This motivates the analysis of RC4.
The Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and the Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) of RC4 are presented below. The data structure contains an array S of size N (typically, 256), which contains a permutation of the integers {0, . . . , N − 1}, two indices i, j and the secret key array K. Given a secret key k of l bytes (typically 5 to 16), the array K of size N is such that K[y] = k[y mod l] for any y, 0 ≤ y ≤ N − 1. 
Swap(S[i], S[j]); t = S[i] + S[j]; Output z = S[t];
Apart from some minor details, the KSA and the PRGA are almost the same. In the KSA, the update of the index j depends on the secret key, whereas the key is not used in the PRGA. One may consider the PRGA as the KSA with all zero key. All additions in both the KSA and the PRGA are additions modulo N .
Initial empirical works based on the weaknesses of the RC4 KSA were explored in [16, 20] and several classes of weak keys had been identified. In [16] , experimental evidences of the bias of the initial permutation bytes after the KSA towards the secret key have been reported. It was also observed in [16] that the first keystream output byte of RC4 leaks information about the secret key when the first two secret key bytes add to 0 mod 256. A more general theoretical study has been performed in [11, 12] which includes the observations of [16] . These biases do propagate to the keystream output bytes as observed in [5, 11] . In [5] , the Glimpse theorem [4] is used to show the propagation of biases in the initial keystream output bytes. On the other hand, a bias in the choice of index has been exploited in [11] to show a bias in the first keystream output byte.
More than a decade ago (1995), Roos [16] pointed out that the initial bytes S[y] of the permutation after the KSA are biased towards some function f y (see Section 1.1 for the definition of f y ) of the secret key. Since then several works [2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] have considered biases of S[y] either with functions of the secret key bytes or with absolute values and discussed applications of these biases. However, no research has so far been published to study how the bytes S[S [y] ] are related to the secret key for different values of y. Here we solve this problem, identifying substantial biases in this direction. It is interesting to note that as the KSA proceeds, the probabilities P (S[y] = f y ) decrease monotonically, whereas the probabilities P (S[S[y]] = f y ) first increases monotonically till the middle of the KSA and then decreases monotonically until the end of the KSA.
Using these results and other related techniques, we find new biases in the keystream output bytes towards the secret key. A complete framework is presented towards the leakage of information about the secret key in the keystream output bytes, that not only reveals new biases at a later stage (256, 257-th bytes), but also points out that the biases propagate further, once the information regarding j is known.
The works [2, 7] also explain how secret key information is leaked in the keystream output bytes. In [2] , it is considered that the first few bytes of the secret key is known and based on that the next byte of the secret key is predicted. The attack is based on how secret key information is leaked in the first keystream output byte of the PRGA. In [7] , the same idea of [2] has been exploited with the Glimpse theorem [4] to find the information leakage about the secret key at the 257-th byte of the PRGA. Note that, our result is better than that of [7] , as in [7] the bias is observed only when certain conditions on the secret key and IV hold. However, the biases we note at 256, 257-th bytes do not assume any such condition on the secret key.
Notations, Contributions and Outline
Let S r be the permutation, i r and j r be the values of the indices i and j after r many rounds of the RC4 KSA, 1 ≤ r ≤ N . Hence S N is the permutation after the complete key scheduling. By S 0 , we denote the initial identity permutation. During round r of the KSA, i r = r − 1, 1 ≤ r ≤ N , and hence the permutation S r after round r can also be denoted by S ir+1 .
Let S G r be the permutation, i G r and j G r be the values of the indices i and j, and z r be the keystream output byte after r many rounds of the PRGA, r ≥ 1. Clearly, i G r = r mod N . We also denote S N by S G 0 as this is the permutation before the PRGA starts. Further, let
for y ≥ 0. Note that all the additions and subtractions related to the key bytes, the permutation bytes and the indices are modulo N . Our contribution can be summarized as follows.
• In Section 2, we present the results related to biased association of S N [S N [y]] towards the linear combination f y of the secret key bytes.
• In Section 3, we present a framework for identifying biases in RC4 keystream bytes towards several linear combinations of the secret key bytes.
-In Section 3.2, we show that P (z N = N − f 0 ) is not a random association. This indicates bias at z 256 .
-In Section 3.3, we use the bias of S N [S N [1] ] (from Section 2) to prove that
is not a random association. This indicates bias at z 257 .
-In Section 3.4, we observe new biases in the initial keystream bytes apart from the known ones [5] . It is shown that for r = 1 and 3 ≤ r ≤ 32, P (z r = f r−1 ) are not random associations.
-These results are taken together in Section 3.5 to present cryptanalytic applications.
• In Section 4, considering that the values of index j are leaked at some points during the PRGA, we show that biases of the keystream output bytes towards the secret key are observed at a much later stage.
Bias of S[S[y]] to Secret Key
We start this section discussing how P (S r [S r [1] ] = f 1 ) varies with round r, 1 ≤ r ≤ N , during the KSA of RC4. Once again, note that
To motivate, we like to refer to Figure 1 that demonstrates the nature of the curve with an experimentation using 10 million randomly chosen secret keys. The probability
where it gets the maximum value around 0.185 and then it decreases to 0.136 at r = N . Note that this nature is not similar to the nature of P (S r [1] = f 1 ) that decreases continuously as r increases during the KSA.
Towards the theoretical results, let us first present the base case for r = 2, i.e., after round 2 of the RC4 KSA.
Proof: The proof is based on three cases.
The probability of this event is
Also, in this case, S 2 [1] ≤ 1. 
by random association except the two previous cases.
Out of that,
proportion of cases.
Lemma 1 shows that after the second round (i = 1, r = 2), the event (
Proof: After the (r − 1)-th round is over, the permutation is S r−1 . In this case,
can occur in two mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways:
We compute the contribution of each separately. In the r-th round, i = r − 1 and hence does not touch the indices 0, . . . , r − 2. Thus, the event (S r [S r [1] 
and j r / ∈ {1, r − 1}. Thus, the contribution of this part is p r−1 ( 
). After this, in the second round (when i = 1), we will have
, and so after the swap,
+ 1 remains in location 1 from the end of round 2 till the end of round (r − 1) (when i = r − 2) with probability (
3. In the r-th round (when i = r − 1), j r becomes 1 with probability
2(r−2) . Adding the above two contributions, we get p r = (
. The recurrence in Lemma 2 along with the base case in Lemma 1 completely specify the probabilities p r for all r ∈[2,. . . ,N].
Proof: Using the approximation 
. Note that the second term (≈ 0.1348 for N = 256) dominates over the negligibly small first term (≈ 0.0011 for N = 256), and so
by 1 in the second term). Now we like to present a more detailed observation. In [16, 12] , the association between 
Theorem 2 After the complete KSA,
Extending similar techniques, the association between
. .] and f y can be studied in general. Though the general results are combinatorially interesting, it is not immediate how they will be applicable to find further weaknesses in the RC4 PRGA. In terms of cryptanalytic point of view, we use the non-random association of S N [S N [1] ] relating f 1 (Theorem 1) to obtain the bias at the 257-th keystream output byte in Section 3.3.
Biases in RC4 Keystream
We present new biases in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, which were not known earlier.
For presenting these results, we need to build a framework. That is presented in Section 3.1. Some biases in initial keystream bytes of RC4 has earlier been pointed out in [5] that has later been discussed in [18] too. Under our framework, the biases of [5] is presented in Theorem 3.
Existing Results under Our Framework
Let S We also denote S N by S G 0 as this is the permutation before the PRGA starts. Let us consider the existing result that relates each permutation byte after the KSA with certain linear combination of the secret key bytes.
Proposition 1 [12, Theorem 1] Consider that the index j takes its values uniformly at random during the KSA rounds. Then,
Substituting r = N in the statement of the above Proposition, we get the following.
Corollary 1
The bias of the final permutation after the KSA towards the secret key is given by
As explained in [12] , the above result indicates significant biases for small values of y (more precisely, for 0 ≤ y ≤ 47), that is supported by the experimental result presented in [16] .
The Glimpse Main Theorem [4, 7] states that after the r-th round of the PRGA, r ≥ 1,
. We rewrite the first relation between S G r [j G r ] and r − z r as the following proposition.
As the Glimpse Main Theorem gives
The idea of writing the Glimpse Main Theorem in the form of Proposition 2 is due to the fact that relating "z r to S G r−1 [i G r ]" will ultimately relate "z r to the secret key bytes", as the permutations in the initial rounds of the PRGA are related to the secret key.
The following lemma shows how the permutation bytes at rounds t and r − 1 of the PRGA, for t + 2 ≤ r, are related.
Proof: We consider two separate cases. is not touched by any of the r − t − 1 many i values anyway). The first event occurs with probability q t,r and the second event occurs with probability (
Thus the contribution of this case is q t,r · ( Thus, adding the above two contributions, we get P (S
The following is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.
Proof: For 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, we have i G r = r. Taking X = f r and t = 0 in Lemma 3, we have q 0,r = P (S
(by Corollary 1),
S
, and still z r = r − f i G r due to random association. So the contribution of this case is P (S
Adding the above two contributions, we get the total probability as w r · 2 N
The following biases were discovered in [5] .
Proof: First, we prove part (1). In the first round, i.e., when r = 1, we have i
(by Corollary 1). Now, using Lemma 4, we get
Next, we prove part (2) . From Corollary 2, w r = P (S
, 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1. Now, using Lemma 4, we get
Note that Lemma 3 or Corollary 2 is not used in proving part (1) of the above theorem. It is proved directly from Corollary 1. In fact, Lemma 3 can not be used in part (1), as here we have r = t + 1 with t = 0 (see Remark 1) .
To have a clear understanding of the quantity of the biases, Table 1 lists the numerical values of the probabilities according to the formula given in Theorem 3. Note that the random association is 1 N , which is 0.0039 for N = 256. Close to the round 48, the biases tend to disappear. This is indicated by the convergence of the values to the probability (1 + 0.05), but still then it is 5% more than the random association.
New Bias in the 256-th Keystream Output Byte
Interestingly, the biases again reappear after rounds 256 and 257. First we present the bias for the 256-th keystream byte.
Proof: During the N -th round of the PRGA, i 
. Thus, by Lemma 4, the bias is given by
For N = 256, w N = w 256 = 0.1392 and the bias turns out to be 0.0045 (i.e., (1 + 0.1392)). Experimental results confirm this bias.
New Bias in the 257-th Keystream Output Byte
We will now show that the bias in the 257-th keystream output byte follows from Theorem 1, i.e.,
Proof: During the (N +1)-th round, we have, i G N +1 = (N +1) mod N = 1. Taking X = f 1 , t = 1 and r = N + 1 in Lemma 3, we have q 1,N +1 = P (S
. Now, using Lemma 4, we get P (
For N = 256, w N +1 = w 257 = 0.0535 and P (z 257 = 257 − f 1 ) = 1 N · (1 + 0.0535) = 0.0041 which also conforms to experimental observation.
More New Biases in Initial Bytes of RC4 Keystream
The biases of z r with r − f r for the initial keystream output bytes have been pointed out in Theorem 3. Interestingly, experimental observation reveals bias of z r with f r−1 too. The results are presented in Table 2 which is experimented over hundred million (10 8 ) randomly chosen keys of 16 bytes. For proper random association, P (z r = f r−1 ) should have been Table 2 : Additional bias of the keystream bytes towards the secret key.
Following our experimental observation, the explanation of the fact P (z 3 = f 2 ) > 1 256 was pointed out in [17] . We present the idea of [17] in this paragraph. Assume that after the third round of the KSA, S 3 [2] takes the value f 2 , and is hit by j later in the KSA. 
Along the same line of arguments given in [17] , we here provide a detailed theoretical analysis of the event z r = f r−1 in general and explicitly derive a formula for P (z r = f r−1 ).
The proof depends on P (S N [r] = 0) for different r values. The explicit formula for the probabilities P (S N [u] = v) was derived for the first time in [9] and the problem was addressed again in [10, 13] .
, where
Proof: Substituting r = 1, y = 0 in Proposition 1, we have P (S 1 [0] = f 0 ) = 1. After the first round, suppose that the index 0 is touched for the first time by j t+1 in round t + 1 of the KSA and due to the swap the value f 0 is moved to the index t, 1 ≤ t ≤ N − 1 and also prior to this swap the value at the index t was t itself, which now comes to the index 0. This means that from round 1 to round t (both inclusive), the pseudo-random index j has not taken the values 0 and t. So, after round t + 1,
. From the end of round t + 1 to the end of the KSA, f 0 remains in index t and t remains in index 0 with probability (
In the first round of the PRGA, j
Since t = 0, the swap of the values at the indices 0 and 1 does not move the value at the index t.
= f 0 and z 1 = f 0 with probability β 1 · γ 1 = δ 1 (say). Since, t can values 1, 2, 3, . . . , N − 1, the total probability is δ 1 · (N − 1) . Substituting the values of β 1 , γ 1 , δ 1 , we get the probability that the event (z 1 = f 0 ) occurs in the above path is p = (
If the above path is not followed, still there is (1 − p) · 1 N probability of occurrence of the event due to random association. Adding these two probabilities, we get the result.
Proof: Substituting y = r − 1 in Proposition 1, we have P (S r [r − 1] = f r−1 ) = α r , where
After round r, suppose that the index r − 1 is touched for the first time by j t+1 in round t + 1 of the KSA and due to the swap the value f r−1 is moved to the index t, r ≤ t ≤ N − 1 and also prior to this swap the value at the index t was t itself, which now comes to the index r − 1. This means that from round r + 1 to round t (both inclusive), the pseudo-random index j has not taken the values r − 1 and t. So, after round t + 1,
. From the end of round t + 1 until the end of the KSA, f r−1 remains in index t and t remains in index r − 1 with probability (
Suppose the indices r − 1, t and r are not touched by the pseudo-random index j in the first r−2 rounds of the PRGA. This happens with probability (
In round r−1 of the PRGA, due to the swap, the value t at index r − 1 moves to the index j 
Since, t can values r, r + 1, r + 2, . . . , N − 1, the total probability is δ r · (N − r). Substituting the values of α r , β r , γ r , δ r , we get the probability that the event (z r = f r−1 ) occurs in the above path is p = (
The theoretically computed values of the probabilities according to the above two theorems match with the experimental values provided in Table 2 . Theorem 7 does not cover cases r = 1 and r = 2. Case r = 1 was already separately presented in Theorem 6. It is interesting to justify the absence of bias in case r = 2 as observed experimentally in Table 2 .
Cryptanalytic Applications
Here we accumulate the results explained above. Consider the first keystream output byte z 1 of the PRGA. We find the results that P (z 1 = 1 − f 1 ) = 0.0053 (see Theorem 3 and Table 1 ) and that P (z 1 = f 0 ) = 0.0043 (see Theorem 6 and Table 2 ). Further, from [11] , we have the result that P (z 1 = f 2 ) = 0.0053. Taking them together, one can check that the P (
The independence assumption in calculating the probability is supported by detailed experimentation with 100 different runs, each run presenting the average probability considering 10 million randomly chosen secret keys of 16 bytes.) Our result indicates that out of randomly chosen 10000 secret keys, in 148 cases on an average,
. If, however, one tries a random association, considering that z 1 will be among three randomly chosen values · 100% = 27% over the random guess.
Looking at z 2 , we have P (z 2 = 2 − f 2 ) = 0.0053 (see Theorem 3 and Table 1 ), which provides an advantage of 0.0053−0.0039 0.0039 · 100% = 36%. Similarly, referring to Theorem 3 and Theorem 7 (and also Table 1 and Table 2 ), significant biases can be observed in P (z r = f r−1 ∨ z r = r − f r ) for r = 3 to 32 over random association.
Now consider the following scenario with the events E 1 , . . . , E 32 , where
, and E r : (z r = f r−1 ∨ z r = r − f r ) for 3 ≤ r ≤ 32. Observing the first 32 keystream output bytes z 1 , . . . , z 32 , one may try to guess the secret key assuming that 3 or more of the events E 1 , . . . , E 32 occur. We experimented with 10 million randomly chosen secret keys of length 16 bytes. We found that 3 or more of the events occur in 0.0028 proportion of cases, which is true for 0.0020 proportion of cases for random association. This demonstrates a substantial advantage (40%) over random guess.
Further Biases when j is Known during PRGA
In all the currently known biases as well as in all the new biases discussed in this paper so far, it is assumed that the value of the pseudo-random index j is unknown. In this section, we are going to show that the biases in the permutation at some stage of the PRGA propagates to the keystream output bytes at a later stage, if the value of the index j at the earlier stage is known.
Suppose that we know the value j G t of j after the round t in the PRGA. With high probability, the value V at the index j G t will remain there until j G t is touched by the deterministic index i for the first time after a few more rounds depending on what was the position (t mod N ) of i at the t-th stage. This immediately leaks V in keystream output byte. More importantly, if the value V is biased to the secret key bytes, then that information will be leaked too.
Formally, let P (S 
. Now, Lemma 4 immediately gives
For some special V 's, the form of η t may be known. In that case, it will be advantageous to probe the values of j at particular rounds. For example, according to Corollary 2, after the (t − 1)-th round of the PRGA, S G t−1 [t] is biased to the linear combination f t of the secret key bytes with probability η t = (
. Now, at round t, f t would move to the index j t due to the swap, and hence S G t [j t ] will be biased to f t with the same probability. So, the knowledge of j t will leak information about f t in round r = t + (j Appendix A
Proof: S y+1 [y] ≤ y means that it can take y +1 many values 0, 1, . . . , y. Suppose
can equal f y in the following way.
1. From round 1 (when i = 0) to x (when i = x − 1), j does not touch the indices x and f y . Thus, after round x, S x [x] = x and S x [f y ] = f y . This happens with probability (
2. In round x + 1 (when i = x), j x+1 becomes equal to f y , and after the swap, S x+1 [x] = f y and S x+1 [f y ] = x. The probability of this event is P (j x+1 = f y ) = 4. In round y + 1 (when i = y), j y+1 becomes equal to f y , and after the swap,
According to [12, Lemma 1] , this happens with probability (
For small values of y, this is approximately equal to (
, which gives a simpler expression. We consider 0 ≤ y ≤ 31 for good approximation.
Considering the above events to be independent, we have
] can equal f y in the following ways: (a) f y has to be equal to y; this happens with probability 1 N , (b) index y is not touched by j in any of the first y rounds; this happens with probability (
y , and (c) in the (y + 1)-th round, j y+1 = f y so that there is no swap; this happens approximately with probability ( 3. In the r-th round (when i = r − 1), j r becomes y with probability 
